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The French Rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty: 







Unlike the 1992 French debate about the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), an 
analysis to explain the fate of the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) must address the failure 
of the May 29, 2005 referendum to ratify the text in France. Why did a member state integral to 
European construction reject a document in which French interests, as defined by Mr. Chirac, 
were very well represented? In order to assemble the pieces of this puzzle, we must start within 
the French domestic context in order to grapple with decisions taken at the table when the French 
president and other heads of government negotiated in the European Council. We must then 
return to the scene of the drama’s climax, inside the hexagon during spring 2005. Mr. Chirac, the 
chief protagonist in this narrative, provides the main link between the domestic context and 
negotiations on constitutional treaty reform.  
A careful reading of one institutional analysis regarding French preferences on the future 
of Europe concludes: ‘In the end, therefore, the French president and his government were for the 
most part alone in deciding what France’s preferences were going to be: of course, it remains to 
be seen whether this will change as the debate on the future of Europe moves into the ratification 
phase – but that is another story’.
1 The pieces in our puzzle begin to come together to reveal a 
picture in which the ratification is the integral part of the story. This paper argues that state-
society relations must be revisited to assess their relevance as an explanation of the French 
referendum outcome. 
 
French Preferences in Constitutional Reform  
 
A traditional reading of France’s European Union policy, and its articulation of national 
preferences on the future of Europe, is interest centered. This reading emphasizes ‘the primacy of 
France’s national calculations of national costs and benefits’.
2 The pursuit of hard-nosed deals 
with other member states figures prominently in this equation.
3  The French government, in its 
focus on proposals concerning the institutional architecture of the Union, aims to maximize 
France’s power and promote national objectives. Concessions are made in constitutional reform 
strictly for material gains to enhance the prospects of a French-dominated Union.
4 Other member 
                                                           
  
♦Colette Mazzucelli, MALD, PhD. is Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Political Science at 
Molloy College, Rockville Centre, New York and recipient of a 2007 Fulbright German Studies Seminar Award for the 
program,'Germany in a Changing Europe: Transatlantic Ties, Transatlantic Challenges' Brussels and Berlin. 
Mazzucelli's most recent publication as contributing author and editor with Derek Beach is 'Leadership in the big bangs 
of European integration', Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2007. 
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3 Jabko. ‘The Importance of being Nice,’ p. 284. 
    
4 Ibid 
  3states are often wary of France’s historical preference for intergovernmental bargains in Council 
decision-making in which the big states dominate. President Chirac’s definition of the French 
national interest was very much in line with this traditional reading. 
  In France there were very few, if any, domestic demands for constitutional reforms 
during the European Convention and intergovernmental conference negotiations. This fact and 
the relative lack of engagement by national parliament representatives to the Convention until the 
ratification debate left French society disconnected from the issues involved in the Constitutional 
Treaty in the early stages.
5 France’s institutional focus at the Convention and during the IGC 
privileged a diplomatic priority: to restart the French-German engine ‘after the disastrous 
performance in Nice’.
6 The public appeal of French proposals, including those made with the 
Federal Republic, was limited. The French government was ‘very weakly constrained by societal 
coalition-building considerations’. Mr. Chirac relied on his constitutional prerogatives in foreign 
policy ‘to decide France’s preferences alone’.
7    
  France was successful at the European Convention in achieving many of its key goals, 
particularly those related to the Council and European foreign policy. Mr. Chirac’s focus was on 
the issues of the European Council president and the European Union foreign minister. The 
French preference to reinforce the European Council represented ‘a strong national demand’.
8 In 
France, the European Council is seen as ‘the expression of the common sovereignty of member 
states’. Over three decades the European Council has evolved from a series of yearly meetings 
among the heads of state and government, in which Mr. Chirac negotiates with his European 
counterparts, into an institution that provides ‘the best link between the member states on one 
side, and the European institutions with their own legitimacy on the other side’.
9 The emphasis on 
the European Council, in which the French president is the democratically elected representative 
of the national interest, is deeply rooted in the political culture of the Fifth Republic. The direct 
link between the French president and people is the source of presidential legitimacy as defined 
by the founder of the Fifth Republic, and it first president, Charles de Gaulle. Chirac, acting very 
much in the Gaullist tradition, emphasized this link, president-people, in his decision to call the 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty.  
  France’s preference was also for the idea of a more permanent chair of the European 
Council, which Chirac advocated with Spain’s Aznar and Britain’s Blair. Their joint 
endorsement, known as the ABC proposal, established a president of the European Council for a 
period of five years or a renewable period of two and a half years.
10 A greater stability in the 
presidency of the European Council was seen in France ‘as strengthening both the continuity of 
the European Council’s activities and the EU’s voice on the international stage’.
11 Its evolution 
from summitry to institution is important to understand because the European Council as a ‘locus 
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9 Ibid 
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11 Guérot, Hughes, Lefebvre and Egenhoff, ‘France, Germany and the UK in the Convention,’ p. 6. 
  4of power’
12 is the point, in the French context, at which European and domestic interests must be 
reconciled. 
  The European Convention was a French idea that afforded the French government the 
opportunity to advance Mr. Chirac’s ‘pet goals’ – a ‘constitution’, a ‘president of Europe’ and a 
‘foreign minister’.
13 Jabko’s argument is that, in a sense, these French gains were largely 
‘symbolic’. This analysis does not consider the possibility that French achievements at the 
Convention made the constitution ‘easier to sell to the French public’. In reality, Jabko is right to 
assert it is unclear that Convention gains ‘really correspond to objective French interests’.
14 This 
is the crux of the matter, to which we must return in the ratification debate.    
 
Not only ‘non’ to Chirac
15: the French referendum and the complexity of ‘separate tables’ 
  
The no vote in the French referendum, driven by national considerations and social concerns, 
highlights a societal preoccupation with job losses in France and the perceived negative impact of 
the Constitutional Treaty on a high national unemployment rate. In economic terms, the text was 
perceived by the French as too liberal,
16 which suggests a French societal view of the Union 
established by the Treaty on European Union as conceding too much to the forces of 
globalization. As one survey reveals, opposition to the president of the Republic and French elite 
politics is among the top five reasons cited for the ‘non,’ in fourth place just before ‘not enough 
of a social Europe’. Post-referendum survey results confirm that four out of five reasons for the 
rejection of the constitutional treaty pertain to employment, economics and social worries. This 
data indicates empirically that we must focus our attention on another piece in the puzzle: the 
ability of the French president to operate on the globalization and the integration tables at the 
same time. This analysis highlights the tensions on two separate, yet related, tables, integration 
and globalization, which exist because of negative perceptions in France of an excessively US-
oriented globalization process.  
  There are three issue areas that offered Mr. Chirac the chance to use integration as a lever 
to assert French interests in an increasingly competitive global environment, which, in the French 
perspective, is driven by a ‘hyperpuissance’, the United States. During the constitutional 
negotiations, the three areas were economics, governance and security.
17  In the economics realm, 
Mr. Chirac proved to be a cautious national leader who did not try to use the dynamics of 
constitutional negotiations to push through bold structural reform measures that would likely have 
encountered more political opposition if taken in a purely domestic context. There were no 
French executive initiatives to champion market integration with an enhanced social dimension as 
an instrument to soften the blows of ‘savage capitalism’. Chirac’s political orientation, unlike that 
of former Socialist president Mitterrand, did not favor this objective, which the French 
referendum vote articulates as a societal preference rooted in a popular perception of the French 
interest. For this reason, the paradox in the recent presidential elections is striking: when given  
the choice of Chirac’s successor, the population chose Mr. Sarkozy, a leader with a commitment 
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  5to reform the French welfare state and liberalize the economy, over Mrs. Royal, the candidate 
with a social vision for France and the intention to consult the people once again on future 
constitutional reforms. 
In the governance realm, Mr. Chirac defended the strengthening of the European Council 
as the institution that offered France in the EU25 the strategic opportunity to increase the Union’s 
weight as an actor on the world stage. During the constitutional negotiations, the French-US 
divergences on Iraq in the Security Council highlighted different national interests and varying 
normative understandings of the role of the United Nations in global governance. The United 
Kingdom provided a further counterweight to France on the decision to invade Iraq. Its support of 
the United States is also a factor in the European Council. During negotiations in that forum, 
however, depending on the issue in question, the French president has more of an opportunity to 
build a coalition of allies to give the Union a role in a 21
st century multi-polar environment. The 
preference to strengthen the European Council is in line with the traditional French conception of 
a world in which balance of power politics conditions the rules of the game. From this 
perspective, this preference offers France a way to shape ‘la regle du jeu’
18 and play by rules of 
the game that offer an alternative to US-directed global governance.   
In the security realm, a European Union doted with a foreign minister and a common 
defense to assert its relevance beyond that of a ‘civilian power’ also reflects longstanding French 
preferences. The paradoxical nature of the French ‘non’ is reflected in Chirac’s success in 
obtaining these French goals in the constitutional treaty. The national population largely supports 
this preference as an expression of the national interest. Successive Eurobarometer surveys 
indicate this trend in popular support. Although the French society voices its approval of an EU 
foreign policy and defense, this preference can only be achieved at a high price in terms of 
national budgetary allocations to accomplish military force modernization and a tradeoff in the 
public service administration sector, with considerable implications for national sovereignty, to 
develop a Brussels-based European foreign policy apparatus. Each of these changes is a hard sell 
as integration’s alternative to American-inspired globalization for a French public long 
accustomed to ėtatism, a strong tradition of the state, which provides generous social welfare 
benefits.  
In order to explain the French referendum outcome, it is helpful to identify the ways in 
which the French people conflated the influence of globalization on the national economy, 
particularly employment and the loss of jobs, and the content of a constitutional treaty that was 
widely perceived as ‘integration furthering globalization’. Chirac, a reluctant and suspicious 
leader vis-à-vis the Maastricht vision of integration, had opportunities to play the nationalist card 
at the European table. This task necessitated manipulating popular attitudes and perceptions, in 
other words, demonstrating that constitutional reform was about protecting France from the 
dangers of globalization through ‘heroic leadership’
19 and the art of skillful diplomacy. Chirac’s 
failure is attributable to the fact that economic issues on the separate tables, globalization and 
integration, were not only perceived as interconnected by a majority of the French population; 
they were understood as mutually reinforcing in popularized debates around issues like the 
“Polish plumber’. 
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Authority, Leadership, and Protest in the French Polity: In Search of a Hero? 
 
The reason societal perceptions led to a negative outcome in the French referendum have 
much to do with the French style of authority vis-à-vis society. In Hoffmann’s analysis of 
authority and leadership styles in the French Third and Fourth Republics, he calls attention to one 
feature common to several French statesmen. This feature Hoffmann identifies as their ‘constant 
call to collective prowess’.  He continues:  
‘Heroic leadership…mobilizes the spectators’ enthusiasm by presenting the performance 
as a national undertaking. So, to rally support the hero makes a conscious attempt to promote the 
audience’s identification with the character on the stage, thus wrapping his legitimacy in their 
complicity. This identification ipso facto evades the problem of organizing and channeling 
support: simply, each citizen is asked to feel like a hero’.
20  In this interpretation, Chirac’s call for 
the popular referendum is a quest for legitimacy and the personal identification of each French 
citizen with a great project of national significance. The problem the referendum campaign raised 
was that of ‘organizing and channeling support’ in a vote that risked asking citizens to judge ‘if 
their opinion of the national interest was being represented abroad’.
21   
  In purely Gaullist terms, just as the General used the referendum in the Fifth Republic, 
Chirac’s call for the popular vote on the constitutional treaty was a bid to enhance ‘his own 
legitimacy and/or institutional power whether or not his positions represented the interests of the 
citizenry’.
22 Once again the comparison of Chirac’s choice for the referendum with that of the 
General’s is instructive. As Walker writes, ‘De Gaulle used referendums to legitimate his policy 
choices by making each vote a vote of confidence in him; de Gaulle, for example, explicitly made 
clear that any vote against one of his referendums was a vote against himself. He lived up to 
Louis XIV’s saying: L’ėtat c’est moi’.
23 The conflation of personal legitimacy with that of the 
referendum vote marked de Gaulle’s particular use of the instrument. In contrast, Chirac, by his 
refusal to resign after the ‘non’, demonstrated the characteristics that defined his national 
leadership style for decades starting with ‘preservation’.
24 Early in the 1980s, Gourevitch argued: 
‘Chirac has sought to assert his identity, visibility, individuality….His impatience has led him to 
an assertiveness which is full of risks….Unlike de Gaulle, he based his appeal increasingly on 
anti-leftism and on defense of very traditional interests….De Gaulle avoided too close an 
identification with the established groups or with simple anti-communism, in order to attract left 
support for his foreign policy and domestic modernization. Chirac has seriously diminished his 
capacity to do either’.
25 A quarter century later, it is possible to take into account the implications 
of Chirac’s political choices, as analyzed by Gourevitch, in terms of the ‘politics of protest’.
26
  Harmsen, in his analysis, references the argument of Matt Qvortrup who explains that 
‘the key to understanding both the French and the Dutch ‘Noes’ lies in the rejection b centre-left 
electorates of a Treaty negotiated predominately by centre-right governments, following a longer 
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  7period of declining socialist influence on the integration process’.
27 Qvortrup makes the case as 
follows: ‘That the constitution was the handiwork of rightist governments is likely to have created 
the impression among left-leaning voters that the constitution was a (more or less veiled) threat to 
the welfare state’.
28
  In his discussion of ‘the unmaking of a constitution,’ Dehousse goes even further to trace 
‘the outline of a deeper social fracture’, which, in his words, the referendum outcome makes 
‘visible’.
29 He writes: ‘On the one hand, social groups of educated individuals open to 
multiculturalism, for whom opening up to Europe and the world constitutes the occasion to 
broaden their personal and professional horizons, and who look to the future with confidence. On 
the other hand, those who see their way of life threatened by economic mutations, the rise of 
precariousness, the reduction of public services, and who are confronted on a daily basis with the 
presence of an imperfectly integrated immigrant population. They have lost all confidence in 
traditional political parties; they are pessimistic as to their future and the future of their children. 
One of the keys to the French vote, and the principal difference with that on the Maastricht 
Treaty, is due to the shift of an important segment of the middle classes, well-represented among 
the voters of the Socialist Party, from the first to the second category, that of fear and this of the 
‘no.’ If this situation were to last and to be generalized, it would endanger the pro-European 
coalition, cutting across partisan cleavages, that exists in a number of countries’.
30        
  Goulard’s analysis identifies the roots of the ratification crisis by making historical 
reference once again to themes in state-society relations: authority; leadership, and protest 
drawing on lessons from Tocqueville’s writings. Hers is a commentary that situates the crisis in 
constitutional terms noting the French taste for revolution and interpreting the national rejection 
as a healthy blow.
31 In the popular perception, the treaty’s rejection could allow for a 
modification of the original compromise, which was, after all, a constitutional document 
concluded under a former president of the Republic, the centrist Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The 
success of those advocating the ‘non’ lay in their ability to make the French people believe the 
illusion that renegotiation was an easy option.
32      
  If we analyze Chirac’s constitutional preference to reproduce the French executive in the 
Union’s institutional system, we must consider Grunberg’s analysis as to why the president opted 
for the referendum. First, if Chirac refused, he risked to appear as an undemocratic leader who 
feared a popular verdict. Second, the referendum is part of the Gaullist political patrimony, and 
the instrument of choice to legitimize constitutional revisions. This is as true in European 
constitutional politics as on the national scene: the French referendum to ratify the Treaty on 
European Union provides the empirical evidence. Third, the use of referenda must be situated in 
the overall context of the European construction process. In 13 countries that adhered to the 
Union since 1992, citizens were consulted directly. Even in Great Britain, the country the most 
attached to a tradition of parliamentary democracy, the head of government declared himself in 
favor of a referendum on the constitutional treaty.
33 In light of the pressure Chirac encountered to 
call the French referendum, we can surmise that his ratification objective fit those parts of the 
constitutional treaty that mattered most in his mind. In this sense, Chirac intended to use the 
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  8national referendum to legitimize the Constitution of the Union as de Gaulle did in 1958 to gain 
the seal of popular approval for the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. 
 
Understanding Domestic Politics to Explain the French Referendum Outcome 
 
The analysis in this paper references and adapts Bulmer’s ‘domestic politics’ approach ‘to make 
explicit the need to investigate the domestic context’ in order to explain the politics of 
constitutional negotiations and national referendum outcomes.
34  In this context, domestic 
preference and coalitions, French institutions, and Mr. Chirac’s negotiating strategy matter. 
 
Domestic Preferences and Coalitions  
 
In the debate on the future of Europe, which defined the context for European constitutional 
negotiations, we must inquire as to the relative weight of French domestic preferences and 
coalitions. Jabko’s analysis explains that ‘the process of national preference formation and 
articulation was characterized by a remarkable insulation, with a huge relative weight for 
diplomacy’. In this milieu, President Chirac was advised by a limited number of professional civil 
servants in the Quai d’Orsay whose concern focused on ‘Europe’s institutional architecture’. The 
relatively free hand these diplomats enjoyed derives from the fact that the French president did 
not confront ‘the necessity of building domestic coalitions to support his positions’. Although 
different political parties were in and out of power, this did not prevent the ‘same few officials’ 
from rotating ‘jobs between political staffs and the regular diplomatic corps’. Institutional reform 
in the European Union was often not a top priority on the president’s agenda: electoral and other 
foreign policy issues dominated.  
  The perception French citizens have of the country’s self-sufficiency, of the advantages 
greater independence can offer within a closed economy that protects its own, is significant. The 
admission that France is dependent on the single European market with its free circulation of 
workers from the East, and its perceived liberal economic philosophy, raises fears in the 
population as well as a fierce resistance to further constitutional reforms in this vein. Perception is 
reality in negotiations as well as politics. The gap between French interests, which segments in 
society perceive as real, and the context that French elites increasingly understand in a European 
institutional environment is increasing over time. In this sense, to understand the chasm that 
opened between 1992 and 2005, we must consider the weight of history. A return to the past is a 
prism to analyze state-society relations, and the complications these relations present for 
constitutional negotiations. 
In the French case, those societal forces that voted against constitutional reform cast their 
ballots against perceived inequalities that would likely result from a yes outcome. The 
aggravation of inequality within the French society, a sentiment among the people centuries in the 
making,
35 once again surfaced to deny Mr. Chirac the approval he sought to enhance his own 
standing in the domestic game. In this sense, the French referendum campaign is a vivid 
illustration of the ways in which the negotiator is caught in the headlights of ‘factional’ conflicts.    
  If we consider the French emphasis on the Union’s institutional architecture during the 
constitutional negotiations, it is evident that these debates were not only opaque: they were 
abstract and far removed from the lives of citizens. Although the Convention method attempted to 
simply the negotiation context, to make the treaty reform process more accessible to people, the 
                                                           
    
34 Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesnse, New Perspectives on EU-Member State Relationships, Research in 
Question, January 2002, (Paris: Centre d’ėtudes and de recherches internationals, 2002), p. 8. Simon Bulmer, 
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35 Goulard, ‘Union européenne les racines de la crise,’ pp.5-8. 
  9key issues at stake in the bargaining for France concerned ‘institutional intricacies’ that do not 
allow ‘opportunities for political mobilization’. Complexity trumped simplicity in constitutional 
negotiations. The impact of European negotiations in the domestic arena was experienced as an 
aftershock once agreement was reached. This revealed not only the popular disinclination to 
abstain in the French referendum. Complexity as a negotiation trump card left Mr. Chirac 





The experience of domestic institutions in French society must be referenced to explain how the 
Constitution of 1958 privileges the politics of exclusion. Elites believe theirs is the expression of 
the ‘general interest’ for France.  It is useful to question, as we pursue this line of thinking, the 
extent to which the concept of ‘corporate democracy’ is relevant to the ratification debate. In his 
research, Russell Hardin discusses the ways, in an era of representative democracy, which 
‘elected officials have become a separate class’.
36 The argument is that ‘many of their actions 
seem to serve their specific interests as office-holders’. At times this is ‘in conflict with the 
interests of their constituents or the citizenry’. In the French case, Hardin’s analysis in terms of 
state institutions speaks to the elite interest simply to hang onto office and power as well as to 
accrue benefits to themselves financially as their careers advance in later years. These are the 
advantages that under normal circumstances would only come to the most powerful officers of 
large corporations or the extremely wealthy.
37    
President Chirac is the key protagonist in a polity that Hardin identifies as a ‘corporate 
democracy’. In the ratification drama of his creation, after the choice for referendum in the 
domestic institutional set-up, President Chirac had to confront the Gaullist legacy and the 
Machiavellian political calculation that a referendum offered the surest prospect to divide the 
French Left. Years earlier the Socialists gave his predecessor, François Mitterrand, a narrow 
victory in the TEU ratification campaign.
38 President Mitterrand, like Chirac, faced censure from 
the French because of unpopular government policies. There were two factors that contributed to 
the narrow victory for the ‘yes’ vote ratifying the Treaty on European Union. First, the 
government campaign for the yes vote was organized well, including the tremendous engagement 
of the Minister for European Affairs, Madame Elisabeth Guigou, to foster a popular debate about 
the Maastricht Treaty across France. Second, Mitterrand did not allow for a long referendum 
campaign thereby denying the opposition forces the time to mobilize.
39  
       
Chirac’s Strategy 
 
The domestic politics approach to analyze the French context in constitutional negotiations 
indicates that Mr. Chirac’s hands were relatively free to conclude a constitutional treaty 
agreement. Tallberg’s analysis confirms that Chirac benefits from ‘personal authority’ as an 
individual source of power in the European Council vis-à-vis other heads of government: ‘Chirac 
                                                           
    
36 Russell Hardin, ‘Transition to Corporate Democracy? in Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist 
Transition, János  Kornai and Susan Rose-Ackerman, eds., (New York and Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 
p. 177.  
    
37 Ibid 
    
38 An analysis of the 1992 French ratification campaign is the subject of Colette Mazzucelli, France and Germany 
at Maastricht Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union, (New York and London: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1997), pp. 207-241. 
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 10is described as a political animal who is very clever and persistent, somewhat arrogant, capable of 
instilling fear in others through his temper, and almost always very influential’.
40   
  Chirac relied on his constitutional prerogatives, his standing in the European Council, 
which, as Jabko argues, the president purposefully strove to rehabilitate since the disaster at Nice, 
and his ability to focus diplomatically on a few institutional objectives that aimed to enhance 
further the weight of France in the Union’s institutional system. As this paper demonstrates, state-
society relations in the Fifth Republic, and, more specifically, the direct link established by the 
referendum between the president and the people, conditions the way in which constitutionalist 
discourse is accepted by the French. Constitutional change must be legitimized by the populace, 
which, in turn, is granted the power to sanction the legitimacy of the president. For this reason, 
further constitutional reforms agreed in the European Council that are not subject to referendums 
in France must break with the tradition of the Fifth Republic.  
The fact that France’s new president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has already taken decisions 
regarding ministerial appointments that some observers have described as ‘revolutionary’ 
suggests that he may yet be a change agent in French institutional politics. The legacy of a 
monarchical past, which insulates the president from the French people, and the pervasive 
influence of elites in constitutional negotiations that privilege diplomatic priorities, provide the 
starting point for an understanding of the French approach to constitutional politics and its 





The French rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty points to the president as the 
actor whose institutional authority can either provoke or suppress the transformation of a polity 
that must at once live with the shadow of de Gaulle and identify a new kind of hero. This leader 
must come to recognize the domestic opportunity costs of constitutional reform in an institutional 
system that privileges the president. Chirac’s strategy to use the referendum simply as an 
instrument of executive politics to gain the domestic advantage was a flawed one. Conversely, his 
decision gave the French society the voice to express their conception of the national interest to a 
president whose policies exacerbated a social fracture. In time this fracture may evolve into the 
structural fault line that redefines state-society relations in France as well as the dynamics of 
change in European integration.  
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